For the past 15 years, Susan Luna, CFA, Kyle Lawson, CFA, and Matt Miller. CFA, have worked together as equity analysts and then equity portfolio managers in the investment management division (BIMCO) of the Broadway Life Insurance Company. For the past five years, the three associates have worked together managing the BIMCO Aggressive Growth Fund (BAGF). During their management tenure the BAGF had excellent performance and was well recognized in the financial press.

Just over one year ago, Broadway Life was acquired by a larger company, Gobble Insurance, and as part of the consolidation process BIMCO was closed. The closure allowed Luna, Lawson and Miller to start their own investment management firm, Trio Investment Management LLC (TIM). TIM focuses on the small capitalization growth equities area. This is the same investment focus as the BAGF, but TIM will have individually managed accounts. Several cases have arisen calling for interpretation as to consistency with CFA Institute Standards of Professional Conduct.

Case 1

TIM markets its investment management services by contracting with small, local bank trust departments. One of the newest bank trust clients for TIM is Shadow Mountain Bank and Trust. Judy Sampson, CFA, the trust officer for Shadow Mountain, has scheduled a meeting with a potential client. When Lawson arrives for the client meeting, he finds that all of the TIM marketing material, including biographies of TIM portfolio managers, has been relabeled by Sampson as the Shadow Mountain Wealth Management Team. Sampson has also added the performance of BAGF into the current TIM Equity Composite Index portfolio and relabeled the resultant combined graph, the Shadow Mountain Equity Composite Index. Sampson states that making such changes would probably please clients and improve the chances of acquiring additional trust management accounts for Shadow Mountain and TIM. Lawson goes along and makes the presentation to the potential client using the Shadow Mountain marketing material and the relabeled BAGF/TIM equity performance record.

Case 2

Susan Luna of TIM is meeting with Sol Wurtzel, an institutional salesman for Turn Byer, a large national brokerage firm. Luna complains that TIM*s technology costs are too high, especially their outside software services costs. TIM currently subscribes to two investment-related software services. The first software vendor is StockCal Software Services (StockCal), which provides valuation and stock charting capabilities TIM uses in their equity research and selection process. The other vendor is Add-Invest Software (Add-Invest), a software program providing account management and performance evaluation reporting which TIM uses in developing monthly reports for all clients. In response to Luna, Wurtzel suggests that Turn Byer has an excellent soft dollar trading desk and would be willing to offer to cover TIM’s StockCal and Add-Invest expenses through soft dollar commissions. Luna then reviews TIM’s projected commission dollars for the year and decides there are more than enough soft dollars to pay the StockCal, AGF and Add-Invest Software bills combined. Luna believes she can be assured of excellent trade execution from Turn Byer and improved profitability for TIM because of the increased use of soft dollars. Luna then directs that the StockCal and Add-Invest software services be paid for with soft dollar or client brokerage dollars.

Case 3

Sol Wurtzel, the equity salesman for Turn Byer, has referred several clients to TIM over the past year. In fact, Wurtzel referrals currently account for almost 20% of the assets managed by TIM. The principals of TIM decide to reward Wurtzel, either by doubling the commissions paid on trades executed through Turn Byer on Wurtzel’s referral accounts, or by paying Wurtzel a cash referral fee for each additional TIM account opened by a Wurtzel referral. The principals agree that any cash referral fee would need to be disclosed to clients in advance.

Case 4

Luna notes that her clients have become increasingly aware of the directed client brokerage / soft dollar commissions issue. At a recent meeting with one of her large pension clients. Service Workers Union Local #1418, the subject of directed commissions came up. Upon learning of the commission dollars available to their account, the Union trustees directed Luna to use their client brokerage of approximately $25,000 to donate to a think lank called the Hoover Study Center of Unions at Samford University. Service Workers trustees believed the Hoover study will increase the public awareness of the benefits unions offer to their members and increase union membership. Luna concurs with the trustee’s judgment on increasing union enrollment as a great goal, and follows the client’s instructions and makes the $25,000 contribution to the Hoover Study Center. Another client, Rosa Lutz, has asked Luna to credit the soft dollar client brokerage proceeds from her personal retirement accounts to Roswell Academy, to update their computer lab. Luna agrees that a new computer lab for Roswell Academy is greatly needed and she allocates 510,000 of Lutz’s commission dollars to Roswell Academy.

Is the use of client brokerage to make the $25,000 educational contribution to the Hoover Study Center of Unions a violation of the CFA Institute Standards of Professional Conduct?

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For the past 15 years, Susan Luna, CFA, Kyle Lawson, CFA, and Matt Miller. CFA, have worked together as equity analysts and then equity portfolio managers in the investment management division (BIMCO) of the Broadway Life Insurance Company. For the past five years, the three associates have worked together managing the BIMCO Aggressive Growth Fund (BAGF). During their management tenure the BAGF had excellent performance and was well recognized in the financial press.

Just over one year ago, Broadway Life was acquired by a larger company, Gobble Insurance, and as part of the consolidation process BIMCO was closed. The closure allowed Luna, Lawson and Miller to start their own investment management firm, Trio Investment Management LLC (TIM). TIM focuses on the small capitalization growth equities area. This is the same investment focus as the BAGF, but TIM will have individually managed accounts. Several cases have arisen calling for interpretation as to consistency with CFA Institute Standards of Professional Conduct.

Case 1

TIM markets its investment management services by contracting with small, local bank trust departments. One of the newest bank trust clients for TIM is Shadow Mountain Bank and Trust. Judy Sampson, CFA, the trust officer for Shadow Mountain, has scheduled a meeting with a potential client. When Lawson arrives for the client meeting, he finds that all of the TIM marketing material, including biographies of TIM portfolio managers, has been relabeled by Sampson as the Shadow Mountain Wealth Management Team. Sampson has also added the performance of BAGF into the current TIM Equity Composite Index portfolio and relabeled the resultant combined graph, the Shadow Mountain Equity Composite Index. Sampson states that making such changes would probably please clients and improve the chances of acquiring additional trust management accounts for Shadow Mountain and TIM. Lawson goes along and makes the presentation to the potential client using the Shadow Mountain marketing material and the relabeled BAGF/TIM equity performance record.

Case 2

Susan Luna of TIM is meeting with Sol Wurtzel, an institutional salesman for Turn Byer, a large national brokerage firm. Luna complains that TIM*s technology costs are too high, especially their outside software services costs. TIM currently subscribes to two investment-related software services. The first software vendor is StockCal Software Services (StockCal), which provides valuation and stock charting capabilities TIM uses in their equity research and selection process. The other vendor is Add-Invest Software (Add-Invest), a software program providing account management and performance evaluation reporting which TIM uses in developing monthly reports for all clients. In response to Luna, Wurtzel suggests that Turn Byer has an excellent soft dollar trading desk and would be willing to offer to cover TIM’s StockCal and Add-Invest expenses through soft dollar commissions. Luna then reviews TIM’s projected commission dollars for the year and decides there are more than enough soft dollars to pay the StockCal, AGF and Add-Invest Software bills combined. Luna believes she can be assured of excellent trade execution from Turn Byer and improved profitability for TIM because of the increased use of soft dollars. Luna then directs that the StockCal and Add-Invest software services be paid for with soft dollar or client brokerage dollars.

Case 3

Sol Wurtzel, the equity salesman for Turn Byer, has referred several clients to TIM over the past year. In fact, Wurtzel referrals currently account for almost 20% of the assets managed by TIM. The principals of TIM decide to reward Wurtzel, either by doubling the commissions paid on trades executed through Turn Byer on Wurtzel’s referral accounts, or by paying Wurtzel a cash referral fee for each additional TIM account opened by a Wurtzel referral. The principals agree that any cash referral fee would need to be disclosed to clients in advance.

Case 4

Luna notes that her clients have become increasingly aware of the directed client brokerage / soft dollar commissions issue. At a recent meeting with one of her large pension clients. Service Workers Union Local #1418, the subject of directed commissions came up. Upon learning of the commission dollars available to their account, the Union trustees directed Luna to use their client brokerage of approximately $25,000 to donate to a think lank called the Hoover Study Center of Unions at Samford University. Service Workers trustees believed the Hoover study will increase the public awareness of the benefits unions offer to their members and increase union membership. Luna concurs with the trustee’s judgment on increasing union enrollment as a great goal, and follows the client’s instructions and makes the $25,000 contribution to the Hoover Study Center. Another client, Rosa Lutz, has asked Luna to credit the soft dollar client brokerage proceeds from her personal retirement accounts to Roswell Academy, to update their computer lab. Luna agrees that a new computer lab for Roswell Academy is greatly needed and she allocates 510,000 of Lutz’s commission dollars to Roswell Academy.

Is the use of client brokerage to make the $ 10,000 contribution to the Roswell Academy a violation of the CFA Institute Standards of Professional Conduct?

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Chester Brothers, LLC, is an investment management firm with $200 million in assets under management. Chester’s equity style is described to clients as a "large cap core" strategy. One year ago, Chester instituted a new compensation plan for its equity portfolio managers. Under this new plan, each portfolio manager receives an annual bonus based upon that manager’s quarterly performance relative to the S&P 500 index. For each quarter of aut-performance, the manager receives a bonus in the amount of 20% of his regular annual compensation. Chester has not disclosed this new plan to clients. Portfolio managers at Chester are not bound by non-compete agreements.

Fames Rogers, CFA, and Karen Pierce, CFA, are both portfolio managers affected by the new policy. Rogers out-performed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters, largely because he began investing his clients1 funds in small cap securities. Chester has recently been citing Rogers’s performance in local media advertising, including claims that "Chester’s star manager, James Rogers, has outperformed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters." The print advertising associated with the media campaign includes a photograph of Rogers, identifying him as James Rogers, CFA. Below his name is a quote apparently attributable to Rogers saying "as a CFA chartcrholdcr I am committed to the highest ethical standards."

A few weeks after the advertising campaign began, Rogers was approached by the Grumpp Foundation, a local charitable endowment with $3 billion in assets, about serving on their investment advisory committee. The committee meets weekly to review the portfolio and make adjustments as needed. The Grumpp trustees were impressed by the favorable mention of Rogers in the marketing campaign. In making their offer, they even suggested that Rogers could mention his position on the advisory committee in future Chester marketing material. Rogers has not informed Chester about the Grumpp offer, but he has not yet accepted the position.

Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a computer model she developed while working al Chester, as well as the most recent list of her buy recommendations, which was created from the output of her computer valuation model. Pierce soon accepted a position at a competing firm, Cheeri Group. On her first day at Cheeri, she contacted each of her five largest former clients, informing them of her new employment and asking that they consider moving their accounts from Chester to Cheeri. During both telephone conversations and e-mails with her former clients, Pierce mentioned that Chester had a new compensation program that created incentives for managers to shift into smaller cap securities.

Cheeri has posted Pierce’s investment performance for the past five years on its Web site, excluding the three most recent quarters.

The footnotes to the performance information include the following two statements:

Statement 1: Includes large capitalization portfolios only.

Statement 2: Results reflect manager’s performance at previous employer.

Chester’s new compensation plan for awarding bonuses to individual portfolio managers:

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Chester Brothers, LLC, is an investment management firm with $200 million in assets under management. Chester’s equity style is described to clients as a "large cap core" strategy. One year ago, Chester instituted a new compensation plan for its equity portfolio managers. Under this new plan, each portfolio manager receives an annual bonus based upon that manager’s quarterly performance relative to the S&P 500 index. For each quarter of aut-performance, the manager receives a bonus in the amount of 20% of his regular annual compensation. Chester has not disclosed this new plan to clients. Portfolio managers at Chester are not bound by non-compete agreements.

Fames Rogers, CFA, and Karen Pierce, CFA, are both portfolio managers affected by the new policy. Rogers out-performed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters, largely because he began investing his clients1 funds in small cap securities. Chester has recently been citing Rogers’s performance in local media advertising, including claims that "Chester’s star manager, James Rogers, has outperformed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters." The print advertising associated with the media campaign includes a photograph of Rogers, identifying him as James Rogers, CFA. Below his name is a quote apparently attributable to Rogers saying "as a CFA chartcrholdcr I am committed to the highest ethical standards."

A few weeks after the advertising campaign began, Rogers was approached by the Grumpp Foundation, a local charitable endowment with $3 billion in assets, about serving on their investment advisory committee. The committee meets weekly to review the portfolio and make adjustments as needed. The Grumpp trustees were impressed by the favorable mention of Rogers in the marketing campaign. In making their offer, they even suggested that Rogers could mention his position on the advisory committee in future Chester marketing material. Rogers has not informed Chester about the Grumpp offer, but he has not yet accepted the position.

Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a computer model she developed while working al Chester, as well as the most recent list of her buy recommendations, which was created from the output of her computer valuation model. Pierce soon accepted a position at a competing firm, Cheeri Group. On her first day at Cheeri, she contacted each of her five largest former clients, informing them of her new employment and asking that they consider moving their accounts from Chester to Cheeri. During both telephone conversations and e-mails with her former clients, Pierce mentioned that Chester had a new compensation program that created incentives for managers to shift into smaller cap securities.

Cheeri has posted Pierce’s investment performance for the past five years on its Web site, excluding the three most recent quarters.

The footnotes to the performance information include the following two statements:

Statement 1: Includes large capitalization portfolios only.

Statement 2: Results reflect manager’s performance at previous employer.

Assuming Rogers would like to accept the offer to serve on the Grumpp investment advisory committee, Rogers’s obligations under the CFA Institute Standards require that he:

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Chester Brothers, LLC, is an investment management firm with $200 million in assets under management. Chester’s equity style is described to clients as a "large cap core" strategy. One year ago, Chester instituted a new compensation plan for its equity portfolio managers. Under this new plan, each portfolio manager receives an annual bonus based upon that manager’s quarterly performance relative to the S&P 500 index. For each quarter of aut-performance, the manager receives a bonus in the amount of 20% of his regular annual compensation. Chester has not disclosed this new plan to clients. Portfolio managers at Chester are not bound by non-compete agreements.

Fames Rogers, CFA, and Karen Pierce, CFA, are both portfolio managers affected by the new policy. Rogers out-performed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters, largely because he began investing his clients1 funds in small cap securities. Chester has recently been citing Rogers’s performance in local media advertising, including claims that "Chester’s star manager, James Rogers, has outperformed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters." The print advertising associated with the media campaign includes a photograph of Rogers, identifying him as James Rogers, CFA. Below his name is a quote apparently attributable to Rogers saying "as a CFA chartcrholdcr I am committed to the highest ethical standards."

A few weeks after the advertising campaign began, Rogers was approached by the Grumpp Foundation, a local charitable endowment with $3 billion in assets, about serving on their investment advisory committee. The committee meets weekly to review the portfolio and make adjustments as needed. The Grumpp trustees were impressed by the favorable mention of Rogers in the marketing campaign. In making their offer, they even suggested that Rogers could mention his position on the advisory committee in future Chester marketing material. Rogers has not informed Chester about the Grumpp offer, but he has not yet accepted the position.

Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a computer model she developed while working al Chester, as well as the most recent list of her buy recommendations, which was created from the output of her computer valuation model. Pierce soon accepted a position at a competing firm, Cheeri Group. On her first day at Cheeri, she contacted each of her five largest former clients, informing them of her new employment and asking that they consider moving their accounts from Chester to Cheeri. During both telephone conversations and e-mails with her former clients, Pierce mentioned that Chester had a new compensation program that created incentives for managers to shift into smaller cap securities.

Cheeri has posted Pierce’s investment performance for the past five years on its Web site, excluding the three most recent quarters.

The footnotes to the performance information include the following two statements:

Statement 1: Includes large capitalization portfolios only.

Statement 2: Results reflect manager’s performance at previous employer.

Chester’s advertising campaign includes claims about Rogers’s investment performance, as well as Rogers’s use and reference to the CFA charter. Is Chester’s advertising campaign consistent with the CFA Institute Standards?

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Chester Brothers, LLC, is an investment management firm with $200 million in assets under management. Chester’s equity style is described to clients as a "large cap core" strategy. One year ago, Chester instituted a new compensation plan for its equity portfolio managers. Under this new plan, each portfolio manager receives an annual bonus based upon that manager’s quarterly performance relative to the S&P 500 index. For each quarter of aut-performance, the manager receives a bonus in the amount of 20% of his regular annual compensation. Chester has not disclosed this new plan to clients. Portfolio managers at Chester are not bound by non-compete agreements.

Fames Rogers, CFA, and Karen Pierce, CFA, are both portfolio managers affected by the new policy. Rogers out-performed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters, largely because he began investing his clients1 funds in small cap securities. Chester has recently been citing Rogers’s performance in local media advertising, including claims that "Chester’s star manager, James Rogers, has outperformed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters." The print advertising associated with the media campaign includes a photograph of Rogers, identifying him as James Rogers, CFA. Below his name is a quote apparently attributable to Rogers saying "as a CFA chartcrholdcr I am committed to the highest ethical standards."

A few weeks after the advertising campaign began, Rogers was approached by the Grumpp Foundation, a local charitable endowment with $3 billion in assets, about serving on their investment advisory committee. The committee meets weekly to review the portfolio and make adjustments as needed. The Grumpp trustees were impressed by the favorable mention of Rogers in the marketing campaign. In making their offer, they even suggested that Rogers could mention his position on the advisory committee in future Chester marketing material. Rogers has not informed Chester about the Grumpp offer, but he has not yet accepted the position.

Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a computer model she developed while working al Chester, as well as the most recent list of her buy recommendations, which was created from the output of her computer valuation model. Pierce soon accepted a position at a competing firm, Cheeri Group. On her first day at Cheeri, she contacted each of her five largest former clients, informing them of her new employment and asking that they consider moving their accounts from Chester to Cheeri. During both telephone conversations and e-mails with her former clients, Pierce mentioned that Chester had a new compensation program that created incentives for managers to shift into smaller cap securities.

Cheeri has posted Pierce’s investment performance for the past five years on its Web site, excluding the three most recent quarters.

The footnotes to the performance information include the following two statements:

Statement 1: Includes large capitalization portfolios only.

Statement 2: Results reflect manager’s performance at previous employer.

When Pierce left her position at Chester, her behavior was inconsistent with the CFA Institute Standards in that:

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Chester Brothers, LLC, is an investment management firm with $200 million in assets under management. Chester’s equity style is described to clients as a "large cap core" strategy. One year ago, Chester instituted a new compensation plan for its equity portfolio managers. Under this new plan, each portfolio manager receives an annual bonus based upon that manager’s quarterly performance relative to the S&P 500 index. For each quarter of aut-performance, the manager receives a bonus in the amount of 20% of his regular annual compensation. Chester has not disclosed this new plan to clients. Portfolio managers at Chester are not bound by non-compete agreements.

Fames Rogers, CFA, and Karen Pierce, CFA, are both portfolio managers affected by the new policy. Rogers out-performed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters, largely because he began investing his clients1 funds in small cap securities. Chester has recently been citing Rogers’s performance in local media advertising, including claims that "Chester’s star manager, James Rogers, has outperformed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters." The print advertising associated with the media campaign includes a photograph of Rogers, identifying him as James Rogers, CFA. Below his name is a quote apparently attributable to Rogers saying "as a CFA chartcrholdcr I am committed to the highest ethical standards."

A few weeks after the advertising campaign began, Rogers was approached by the Grumpp Foundation, a local charitable endowment with $3 billion in assets, about serving on their investment advisory committee. The committee meets weekly to review the portfolio and make adjustments as needed. The Grumpp trustees were impressed by the favorable mention of Rogers in the marketing campaign. In making their offer, they even suggested that Rogers could mention his position on the advisory committee in future Chester marketing material. Rogers has not informed Chester about the Grumpp offer, but he has not yet accepted the position.

Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a computer model she developed while working al Chester, as well as the most recent list of her buy recommendations, which was created from the output of her computer valuation model. Pierce soon accepted a position at a competing firm, Cheeri Group. On her first day at Cheeri, she contacted each of her five largest former clients, informing them of her new employment and asking that they consider moving their accounts from Chester to Cheeri. During both telephone conversations and e-mails with her former clients, Pierce mentioned that Chester had a new compensation program that created incentives for managers to shift into smaller cap securities.

Cheeri has posted Pierce’s investment performance for the past five years on its Web site, excluding the three most recent quarters.

The footnotes to the performance information include the following two statements:

Statement 1: Includes large capitalization portfolios only.

Statement 2: Results reflect manager’s performance at previous employer.

Pierce’s behavior upon assuming her new position at Cheeri can best be described as violating CFA Institute Standards because she:

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Chester Brothers, LLC, is an investment management firm with $200 million in assets under management. Chester’s equity style is described to clients as a "large cap core" strategy. One year ago, Chester instituted a new compensation plan for its equity portfolio managers. Under this new plan, each portfolio manager receives an annual bonus based upon that manager’s quarterly performance relative to the S&P 500 index. For each quarter of aut-performance, the manager receives a bonus in the amount of 20% of his regular annual compensation. Chester has not disclosed this new plan to clients. Portfolio managers at Chester are not bound by non-compete agreements.

Fames Rogers, CFA, and Karen Pierce, CFA, are both portfolio managers affected by the new policy. Rogers out-performed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters, largely because he began investing his clients1 funds in small cap securities. Chester has recently been citing Rogers’s performance in local media advertising, including claims that "Chester’s star manager, James Rogers, has outperformed the S&P 500 index in each of the last three quarters." The print advertising associated with the media campaign includes a photograph of Rogers, identifying him as James Rogers, CFA. Below his name is a quote apparently attributable to Rogers saying "as a CFA chartcrholdcr I am committed to the highest ethical standards."

A few weeks after the advertising campaign began, Rogers was approached by the Grumpp Foundation, a local charitable endowment with $3 billion in assets, about serving on their investment advisory committee. The committee meets weekly to review the portfolio and make adjustments as needed. The Grumpp trustees were impressed by the favorable mention of Rogers in the marketing campaign. In making their offer, they even suggested that Rogers could mention his position on the advisory committee in future Chester marketing material. Rogers has not informed Chester about the Grumpp offer, but he has not yet accepted the position.

Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a Pierce has not fared as well as Rogers. She also shifted into smaller cap securities, but due to two extremely poor performing large cap stocks, her performance lagged the S&P 500 index for the first three quarters. After an angry confrontation with her supervisor, Pierce resigned. Pierce did not take any client information with her, but when she left she did take a copy of a computer model she developed while working al Chester, as well as the most recent list of her buy recommendations, which was created from the output of her computer valuation model. Pierce soon accepted a position at a competing firm, Cheeri Group. On her first day at Cheeri, she contacted each of her five largest former clients, informing them of her new employment and asking that they consider moving their accounts from Chester to Cheeri. During both telephone conversations and e-mails with her former clients, Pierce mentioned that Chester had a new compensation program that created incentives for managers to shift into smaller cap securities.

Cheeri has posted Pierce’s investment performance for the past five years on its Web site, excluding the three most recent quarters.

The footnotes to the performance information include the following two statements:

Statement 1: Includes large capitalization portfolios only.

Statement 2: Results reflect manager’s performance at previous employer.

Cheeri’s presentation of Pierce’s investment performance is inconsistent with CFA Institute Standards because:

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Susan Foley, CFA, is Chief Investment Officer of Federated Investment Management Co. (FIMCO), a large investment management firm that includes a family of mutual funds as well as individually managed accounts. The individually managed accounts include individuals, personal trusts, and employee benefit plans. In the past few months, Foley has encountered a couple of problems.

The Tasty IPO

Most portfolio managers of FIMCO have not participated in the initial public offering (IPO) market in recent years. However, recent changes to the compensation calculation at FIMCO have tied manager bonuses to portfolio performance. The changes were outlined in a letter that was sent out to clients and prospects shortly before the new bonus structure took effect. Carl Lee, CFA, is one portfolio manager who believes that investing in IPOs may add to his client’s equity performance and, in turn, increase his bonus. While Lee’s individual clients have done quite well this year, his employee benefit plans have suffered as a result of limited exposure to the strongest performing sector of the market. Lee has placed an order for all employee benefit plans to receive an allocation of the Tasty Doughnut IPO. Tasty is an over-subscribed IPO that Lee knew would make money for his clients. When he placed the order, Lee’s assistant reminded him that one pension plan. Ultra Airlines, was explicitly prohibited from investing in IPOs in its investment policy statement, due to the under-funded status of the pension plan. Lee responded that the Tasty IPO would never actually be owned in Ultra’s account, because he would sell the IPO stock before the end of the day and realize a profit before the position ever hit the books.

Another manager, Franz Mason, CFA, who manages accounts for about 150 individuals, is also interested in the Tasty IPO. Mason visits Lee’s portfolio assistant and quizzes him about Lee’s participation in the Tasty deal. Mason is sure that Lee would not have bought into Tasty unless he had done his homework. Mason places an order for 10,000 shares of the IPO. Mason returns to his desk and begins to allocate the IPO shares among his clients. Mason divides his client base into two groups: clients who are income-oriented and clients who arc capital gains-oriented. Mason believes those clients that are income-oriented are fairly risk averse and could not replace lost capital if the Tasty Doughnut deal lost money. Mason believes the capital gains-oriented accounts arc better able to withstand the potential loss associated with the Tasty IPO. Accordingly, Mason allocates his 10,000 share order of the Tasty IPO strictly to his capital appreciation clients using a pro rata allocation based on the size of the assets under management in each account.

FIMCO Income Fund (FIF)

Over the past three years, the FIF, with $5 billion in assets, has been the company’s best performing mutual fund. Jane Ryan, CFA, managed the FIF for seven years, but resigned one year ago to start her own hedge fund. Under Ryan, the FIF invested in large cap stocks with reliable dividends. The fund’s prospectus specifies that FIF will invest only in stocks that have paid a dividend for at least two quarters, and have a market capitalization in excess of $2.5 billion. Foley appointed FIMCO’s next best manager (based on 5-year performance numbers) Steve Parsons, CFA, to replace Ryan. Parsons had been a very successful manager of the FIMCO Opportunity Fund, which specialized in small capitalization stocks. Six months after Parsons took over the helm at FIF. the portfolio had changed. The average market capitalization of FIF’s holdings was $12.8 billion, as opposed to $21 billion a year ago. Over the same period, the average dividend yield on the portfolio had fallen from 3.8% to 3.1%. The performance of the FIF lagged its peer group for the first time in three years. In response to the lagging performance, Parsons purchased five stocks six months ago. Parsons bought all five stocks, none of which paid a dividend at the time of purchase, in anticipation that each company was likely to initiate dividends in the near future. So far, four of the stocks have initiated dividend payments, and their performance has benefited as a result. The fifth stock did not initiate a dividend, and Parsons sold the position last week. Largely due to the addition of the five new stocks, the FIF’s performance has led its peer group over the past six months.

Before leaving FIMCO, Ryan had told Foley that above-average returns from both the management and client side could be gained from entering into the risk-arbitrage hedge fund market. Ryan had tried to convince FIMCO management to enter the risk-arbitrage market, but the firm determined that no one had the experience or research capability to run a risk-arbitrage operation. As a result, Ryan started the Plasma Fund LLC one month after leaving FIMCO. Foley remembers seeing Ryan at the annual FIMCO client dinner parly (before she left the firm) discussing the profits to be made from risk-arbitrage investing with several large FIF shareholders. Ryan mentioned that she would be opening the Plasma Fund to these FIMCO clients, several of whom made substantial investments in the first months of Plasma Fund’s life. After Ryan resigned and left her office, Foley performed an inventory of firm assets signed out to Ryan. One of the copies of the proprietary stock selection software packages, FIMCO-SelectStock, assigned to Ryan was missing along with several of the SelectStock operating manuals. When Foley contacts Ryan about the missing software and manuals, Ryan states that the reason she took the SelectStock software was that it was an out of date version that FIMCO’s information technology staff had urged all managers to discard.

Regarding Lee’s order for employee benefit plans to receive an allocation of the Tasty Doughnut IPO, and his purchase of the Tasty Doughnut IPO for the Ultra Airlines Pension account, which of the following statements is most accurate?

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Susan Foley, CFA, is Chief Investment Officer of Federated Investment Management Co. (FIMCO), a large investment management firm that includes a family of mutual funds as well as individually managed accounts. The individually managed accounts include individuals, personal trusts, and employee benefit plans. In the past few months, Foley has encountered a couple of problems.

The Tasty IPO

Most portfolio managers of FIMCO have not participated in the initial public offering (IPO) market in recent years. However, recent changes to the compensation calculation at FIMCO have tied manager bonuses to portfolio performance. The changes were outlined in a letter that was sent out to clients and prospects shortly before the new bonus structure took effect. Carl Lee, CFA, is one portfolio manager who believes that investing in IPOs may add to his client’s equity performance and, in turn, increase his bonus. While Lee’s individual clients have done quite well this year, his employee benefit plans have suffered as a result of limited exposure to the strongest performing sector of the market. Lee has placed an order for all employee benefit plans to receive an allocation of the Tasty Doughnut IPO. Tasty is an over-subscribed IPO that Lee knew would make money for his clients. When he placed the order, Lee’s assistant reminded him that one pension plan. Ultra Airlines, was explicitly prohibited from investing in IPOs in its investment policy statement, due to the under-funded status of the pension plan. Lee responded that the Tasty IPO would never actually be owned in Ultra’s account, because he would sell the IPO stock before the end of the day and realize a profit before the position ever hit the books.

Another manager, Franz Mason, CFA, who manages accounts for about 150 individuals, is also interested in the Tasty IPO. Mason visits Lee’s portfolio assistant and quizzes him about Lee’s participation in the Tasty deal. Mason is sure that Lee would not have bought into Tasty unless he had done his homework. Mason places an order for 10,000 shares of the IPO. Mason returns to his desk and begins to allocate the IPO shares among his clients. Mason divides his client base into two groups: clients who are income-oriented and clients who arc capital gains-oriented. Mason believes those clients that are income-oriented are fairly risk averse and could not replace lost capital if the Tasty Doughnut deal lost money. Mason believes the capital gains-oriented accounts arc better able to withstand the potential loss associated with the Tasty IPO. Accordingly, Mason allocates his 10,000 share order of the Tasty IPO strictly to his capital appreciation clients using a pro rata allocation based on the size of the assets under management in each account.

FIMCO Income Fund (FIF)

Over the past three years, the FIF, with $5 billion in assets, has been the company’s best performing mutual fund. Jane Ryan, CFA, managed the FIF for seven years, but resigned one year ago to start her own hedge fund. Under Ryan, the FIF invested in large cap stocks with reliable dividends. The fund’s prospectus specifies that FIF will invest only in stocks that have paid a dividend for at least two quarters, and have a market capitalization in excess of $2.5 billion. Foley appointed FIMCO’s next best manager (based on 5-year performance numbers) Steve Parsons, CFA, to replace Ryan. Parsons had been a very successful manager of the FIMCO Opportunity Fund, which specialized in small capitalization stocks. Six months after Parsons took over the helm at FIF. the portfolio had changed. The average market capitalization of FIF’s holdings was $12.8 billion, as opposed to $21 billion a year ago. Over the same period, the average dividend yield on the portfolio had fallen from 3.8% to 3.1%. The performance of the FIF lagged its peer group for the first time in three years. In response to the lagging performance, Parsons purchased five stocks six months ago. Parsons bought all five stocks, none of which paid a dividend at the time of purchase, in anticipation that each company was likely to initiate dividends in the near future. So far, four of the stocks have initiated dividend payments, and their performance has benefited as a result. The fifth stock did not initiate a dividend, and Parsons sold the position last week. Largely due to the addition of the five new stocks, the FIF’s performance has led its peer group over the past six months.

Before leaving FIMCO, Ryan had told Foley that above-average returns from both the management and client side could be gained from entering into the risk-arbitrage hedge fund market. Ryan had tried to convince FIMCO management to enter the risk-arbitrage market, but the firm determined that no one had the experience or research capability to run a risk-arbitrage operation. As a result, Ryan started the Plasma Fund LLC one month after leaving FIMCO. Foley remembers seeing Ryan at the annual FIMCO client dinner parly (before she left the firm) discussing the profits to be made from risk-arbitrage investing with several large FIF shareholders. Ryan mentioned that she would be opening the Plasma Fund to these FIMCO clients, several of whom made substantial investments in the first months of Plasma Fund’s life. After Ryan resigned and left her office, Foley performed an inventory of firm assets signed out to Ryan. One of the copies of the proprietary stock selection software packages, FIMCO-SelectStock, assigned to Ryan was missing along with several of the SelectStock operating manuals. When Foley contacts Ryan about the missing software and manuals, Ryan states that the reason she took the SelectStock software was that it was an out of date version that FIMCO’s information technology staff had urged all managers to discard.

Mason used two allocation plans for the Tasty IPO: the first decision was based on the orientation of the account (income vs. capital gains), and the second decision was based on the relative size of each account. Did Mason violate CFA Institute Standards of Professional Conduct with respect to either allocation decision?

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