ACAMS CAMS-FCI Advanced CAMS-Financial Crimes Investigations Online Training
ACAMS CAMS-FCI Online Training
The questions for CAMS-FCI were last updated at Mar 29,2025.
- Exam Code: CAMS-FCI
- Exam Name: Advanced CAMS-Financial Crimes Investigations
- Certification Provider: ACAMS
- Latest update: Mar 29,2025
The investigative department of a financial institution (Fl) receives an internal escalation notice from the remittance department for a SWIFT message requesting a refund due to potential fraud. The notice indicates that a total of three international incoming remittances were transferred to a corporate customer from Country A, in the amount of approximately 5 million EUR for each. The first two incoming remittances had been exchanged into currency B and transferred out to Country B a few days ago. The third incoming remittance has been held by the remittance department.
As noted from the KYC profile, the corporate customer is working in the wood industry. with the last account review completed 3 months ago. Since the account’s opening. there has been no history of a large amount of funds flowing through the account. The investigator conducts an Internet search and finds that the remitter is a food beverage company.
The same morning, the investigator receives a call from a financial intelligence unit (FIU) inquiring about the same incident. The FIU states that it will issue a warrant to freeze the account on the same day.
After further review, the decision is made that transactions appear suspicious.
Which are the next steps the investigator should take? (Select Two.)
- A . Close the customer’s accounts since the FIU is issuing a warrant to freeze the funds.
- B . Contact local LE and advise them of the investigation details to help speed up the investigation and prosecution.
- C . Provide additional information to the LE upon receiving a formal request.
- D . Close the investigation as the FIU is already on this matter, and they will inform LE if needed.
- E . Gather all the information that would be useful for law enforcement (LE) and recommend filing a
SAR/STR
The investigative department of a financial institution (Fl) receives an internal escalation notice from the remittance department for a SWIFT message requesting a refund due to potential fraud. The notice indicates that a total of three international incoming remittances were transferred to a corporate customer from Country A, in the amount of approximately 5 million EUR for each. The first two incoming remittances had been exchanged into currency B and transferred out to Country B a few days ago. The third incoming remittance has been held by the remittance department.
As noted from the KYC profile, the corporate customer is working in the wood industry. with the last account review completed 3 months ago. Since the account’s opening. there has been no history of a large amount of funds flowing through the account. The investigator conducts an Internet search and finds that the remitter is a food beverage company.
The same morning, the investigator receives a call from a financial intelligence unit (FIU) inquiring about the same incident. The FIU states that it will issue a warrant to freeze the account on the same day.
Which steps for documenting the final investigation decision are appropriate for the investigator in this scenario?
- A . Exclude any open-source information from record-keeping since it is publicly available.
- B . Add all of the information the Fl has about the subject, their account(s) activity, research results. KYC information, etc. to the SAR/STR.
- C . Document the investigation process and retain all relevant documents in the case management system.
- D . Do not document the investigation process if a SAR/STR is not filed.
Refer to the exhibit.
In a review of the account activity associated with Nadine Kien, an investigator observes a large number of small- to medium-size deposits from numerous individuals from several different global regions. The money is then transferred to a numbered company.
Which is the next best course of action for the investigator?
- A . Complete the monthly review and note the activity for next month’s review.
- B . File a SAR/STR on the account activity in relation to a potential funnel account.
- C . Recommend the account for exit due to frequent global transactions.
- D . No further action is required as the customer is already rated at high-risk and the monthly spending is within expectations.
Refer to the exhibit.
During a review of the accounts related to Richard Aston, an investigator notices a high number of incoming payments from various individuals. They also notice that these incoming payments typically occur during large sporting events or conferences.
As a result of the account review, of which illegal activity does the investigator have reasonable grounds to suspect Richard Aston?
- A . Embezzling from the hotel
- B . Aftermarket sales of entertainment admission tickets
- C . Human trafficking
- D . Sports betting
An investigator is reviewing an alert for unusual activity. System scanning detected a text string within a company customer’s account transactions that indicates the account may have been used for a drug or drug paraphernalia purchase Based on the KYC profile, the investigator determines the customer’s company name and business type are marketed as a gardening supplies company. The investigator reviews the account activity and notes an online purchase transaction that leads the investigator to a website that sells various strains of marijuana. Additional account review detects cash deposits into the account at the branch teller lines, so the investigator reaches out to the teller staff regarding the transactions. The teller staff member reports that the business customers have frequently deposited cash in lower amounts. The teller, without prompting, adds that one of the transactors would occasionally smell of a distinct scent of marijuana smoke.
Which are the best next steps for the investigator to take? (Select Three.)
- A . Review the customer’s transaction history.
- B . Request information from the internet service provider who hosts the website.
- C . Check internal KYC information.
- D . Research other customer accounts for transactions to the same website.
- E . Conduct adverse media and open-source searches on the customer’s background.
- F . Identify if the customer has opened accounts in an urban city area.
An investigator is reviewing an alert for unusual activity. System scanning detected a text string within a company customer’s account transactions that indicates the account may have been used for a drug or drug paraphernalia purchase. Based on the KYC profile, the investigator determines the customer’s company name and business type are marketed as a gardening supplies company. The investigator reviews the account activity and notes an online purchase transaction that leads the investigator to a website that sells various strains of marijuan
a. Additional account review detects cash deposits into the account at the branch teller lines, so the investigator reaches out to the teller staff regarding the transactions. The teller staff member reports that the business customers have frequently deposited cash in lower amounts. The teller, without prompting, adds that one of the transactors would occasionally smell of a distinct scent of marijuana smoke.
Which information should be included in the SAR/STR?
- A . The customer information, including KYC background
- B . A transaction that is commensurate with the customer’s background
- C . The fact that one of the transactors occasionally smelled of marijuana smoke
- D . Details of the transactor’s social media accounts
A financial institution (Fl) banks a money transmitter business (MTB) located in Miami. The MTB regularly initiates wire transfers with the ultimate beneficiary in Cuba and legally sells travel packages to Cuba. The wire transfers for money remittances comply with the country’s economic sanctions policies. A Fl investigator on the sanctions team reviews each wire transfer to ensure compliance with sanctions and to monitor transfer details.
An airline located in Cuba, unrelated to the business, legally sells airline tickets in Cuba to Cuban citizens wanting to travel outside of Cuba. The airline tickets are purchased using Cuban currency (CUC).
The MTB wants 100,000 USD worth of CUC. Purchasing CUC from a Cuban bank includes a 4% fee. The MTB contacts the airline to ask if the airline will trade its CUC for USD at a lower exchange fee than the Cuban bank. The airline agrees to a 1% fee. The MTB initiates a wire transfer to the airline which appears as normal activity in the monitoring system because of the business’ travel package sales.
Which investigative actions should the investigator take concerning the 100.000 USD wire transfer? (Select Three.)
- A . Review the wire transfer protocols for this customer.
- B . Gather all account activity for Fl clients that purchased packages from the airline.
- C . Review a sampling of wire transfers initiated by travel companies with Cuba travel packages.
- D . Recommend a plan for the Fl’s management to restrict the account relationship.
- E . Review regulations applicable to foreign currency trading transactions.
- F . Locate and review licenses, registrations, and account operating agreements associated with the MTB account.
A financial institution (Fl) banks a money transmitter business (MTB) located in Miami. The MTB regularly initiates wire transfers with the ultimate beneficiary in Cuba and legally sells travel packages to Cuba. The wire transfers for money remittances comply with the country’s economic sanctions policies. A Fl investigator on the sanctions team reviews each wire transfer to ensure compliance with sanctions and to monitor transfer details.
An airline located in Cuba, unrelated to the business, legally sells airline tickets in Cuba to Cuban citizens wanting to travel outside of Cuba. The airline tickets are purchased using Cuban currency (CUC).
The MTB wants 100,000 USD worth of CUC. Purchasing CUC from a Cuban bank includes a 4% fee. The MTB contacts the airline to ask if the airline will trade its CUC for USD at a lower exchange fee than the Cuban bank. The airline agrees to a 1% fee. The MTB initiates a wire transfer to the airline which appears as normal activity in the monitoring system because of the business’ travel package sales.
The investigator recommends that a SAR/STR be filed.
What documentation should be referenced in the SAR/STR filing? (Select Three.)
- A . All documents related to the agreement between the airline and the MTB
- B . Cumulative dollar amount of the wire transfer activity
- C . Airline’s ticket sales and passenger list
- D . Cumulative dollar amount for transactions listing for all the MTB account’s wire activity regarding travel packages
- E . Licensing information regarding the travel agency providing tourist sales to Cuba
- F . Account documentation on all related accounts maintained by the MTB
An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.
KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank in 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.
• X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;
• Y is the authorized signatory of this entity customer.
This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.
KYC PROFILE
Customer Name: AAA International Company. Ltd
Customer ID: 123456
Account Opened: June 2017
Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020
Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017
AML risk level: High
Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans and Trade Finance
Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount
During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul 2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:
TRANSACTION JOURNAL
Review dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021 For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third parties
Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third parties
For United States Dollars (USD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third parties
Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.
RFI Information and Supporting documents:
According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:
1) All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank. Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.
2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank’s customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loan
Based on the KYC profile and the transaction journal, the pattern of activity shows a deviation in:
- A . expected vs. actual activity.
- B . customer risk rating
- C . product risk rating.
- D . U.S. currency incoming vs. outgoing transaction rales.
An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.
KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank since 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.
• X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;
• Y is is the authorized signatory of this entity customer.
This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.
KYC PROFILE
Customer Name: AAA International Company. Ltd
Customer ID: 123456
Account Opened: June 2017
Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020
Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017
AML risk level: High
Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans, and Trade Finance
Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount
During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul 2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:
TRANSACTION JOURNAL
Review dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021 For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third parties
Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third parties
For United States Dollars (USD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third parties
Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.
RFI Information and Supporting documents:
According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:
1J All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank. Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.
2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank’s customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay a loan
Which suspicious activity should the investigator identify during the review of the loan agreements?
- A . AAA International Company Ltd.’s account has transactions in HKD and USD.
- B . Y is the authorized signatory on the beneficial ownership form.
- C . Online information found that X is the chairman of a business group of companies.
- D . Y signed on behalf of the lenders.